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The War Powers Resolution at 
40: Still an Unconstitutional, 
Unnecessary, and Unwise Fraud 
That Contributed Directly to 
the 9/11 Attacks 
Robert F. Turner, SJD* 
The 1973 War Powers Resolution was a fraud upon the 
American people, portrayed as a legislative fix to the problem of 
“imperial presidents” taking America to war in Korea and 
Vietnam without public approval or the constitutionally required 
legislative sanction. By its own terms, the War Powers 
Resolution would not have stopped the Vietnam War. Sadly, this 
and other legislative intrusions upon the constitutional authority 
of the president contributed to the loss of millions of lives in 
places like Cambodia, Afghanistan, Angola, and Central 
America. The statute played a clear role in encouraging the 
terrorist attack that killed 241 Marines in 1983, and equally 
clearly encouraged Osama bin Laden to kill thousands of 
Americans on September 11, 2001. Similarly unconstitutional 
usurpations of presidential power prevented our Intelligence 
Community from preventing those attacks and dissuaded a key 
ally from sharing sensitive information that might also have 
prevented them. After forty years, the time has come to bring 
an end to this congressional lawbreaking. 
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I. Introduction 
More than forty-six years have passed since I first became 
interested in the constitutional separation of foreign affairs powers 
while listening to a lecture by the legendary University of Chicago 
scholar Professor Quincy Wright.1 At the time I was working on my 
undergraduate honors thesis on the war in Indochina, and following 
graduation I was commissioned in the Army and served twice in the 
Republic of Vietnam. After leaving the Army at the end of 1971 as a 
junior Captain, I accepted a fellowship at Stanford’s Hoover 
Institution on War, Revolution and Peace where I continued my work 
on the war and authored the first major English-language history of 
Vietnamese Communism.2  
The War Powers Resolution was enacted over President Nixon’s 
veto on November 7, 1973, as a response to the Vietnam War.3 Just 
over a month later, my Hoover Institution fellowship landed me in the 
office of Assistant Senate Minority Leader Robert P. Griffin, of 
Michigan, a member of the Foreign Relations Committee. Soon 
thereafter, the Senator hired me off of the fellowship and for five years 
I served as his national security adviser, dealing directly with every 
war powers issue addressed in the Senate during that period. In 1981, 
while serving as Special Assistant to the Under Secretary of Defense 
for Policy, I wrote an eighty-page memorandum on the modern utility 
of formal declarations of war.4 Later, while I was an attorney in the 
White House, I frequently briefed members of Congress (including, at 
the time, such largely unknown figures as Representative Newt 
Gingrich and Senator Dan Quayle) about the 1973 statute at the 
request of the National Security Adviser. I worked on war powers 
issues again in 1984–198585 while serving as Acting Assistant 
Secretary of State for Legislative Affairs.  
As a scholar, I’ve published two books5 specifically about the War 
Powers Resolution and testified repeatedly in both the House and 
1. Among his many other achievements, Professor Wright served as 
President of the American and International Political Science 
Associations and of the American Society of International Law. His 1922 
volume, The Control of American Foreign Relations, remains a classic 
in the field. 
2. ROBERT F. TURNER, VIETNAMESE COMMUNISM: ITS ORIGINS AND 
DEVELOPMENTS (1975).  
3. H.R.J. Res. 542, Pub. L. 93-148, 87 Stat. 555 (1973) (codified at 50 
U.S.C. §§ 1541–1548). 
4. Memorandum from Robert F. Turner on Utility of Declaration of War 
(Dec. 9, 1981), available at http://www.virginia.edu/cnsl/pdf/Turner 
1981WarMemo.pdf. 
5. ROBERT F. TURNER, THE WAR POWERS RESOLUTION: ITS 
IMPLEMENTATION IN THEORY AND PRACTICE (1983); ROBERT F. TURNER, 
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Senate on the statute. My 1,700-page SJD (academic law doctorate) 
dissertation dealt heavily with war powers issues, and over nearly a 
quarter-of-a-century I’ve taught courses and seminars dealing with 
constitutional war powers at the undergraduate and post-graduate 
level at the University of Virginia, where in 1981 I co-founded the 
Center for National Security Law. 
All of that is to emphasize that these are not new issues to me. 
And while I like to think that my views have evolved and become 
perhaps a bit more sophisticated over the decades, my basic 
conclusions have not changed since 1973—irrespective of which 
political party has occupied the White House. Put simply, I believe 
the War Powers Resolution is unconstitutional, unnecessary, and 
unwise. This is not merely a theoretical problem, because in my view 
that statute has done tremendous harm to U.S. national security and 
the cause of world peace—including playing a key role in persuading 
Osama bin Laden to launch the 9/11 attacks that killed nearly 3,000 
innocent Americans and precipitated conflicts that claimed hundreds 
of thousands of lives and depleted our treasury by more than one 
trillion dollars.6 
My time is limited, but let me at least summarize my concerns. 
II. The War Powers Resolution Is Unconstitutional 
To understand the separation of constitutional powers regarding 
“war” and the use of military force, we need first of all to appreciate 
the importance of Article II, Section 1, which grants to “a President 
of the United States” the nation’s “executive Power.”7 Today, 
Americans read that clause and assume it conveys merely the power 
to “execute” the laws and policies established by Congress. But that 
was not the understanding of the men who wrote the Constitution 
during the summer of 1787. They understood “executive power” as 
the term was used by Locke,8 Montesquieu,9 and Blackstone10—whose 
REPEALING THE WAR POWERS RESOLUTION: RESTORING THE RULE OF 
LAW IN U.S. FOREIGN POLICY (1991) [hereinafter TURNER, REPEALING 
THE WAR POWERS RESOLUTION]. 
6. See, e.g., AMY BELASCO, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 33110, THE COST 
OF IRAQ, AFGHANISTAN, AND OTHER GLOBAL WAR ON TERROR 
OPERATIONS SINCE 9/11 (2011). 
7. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1.  
8. See JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT ¶¶ 146–47 (1690). 
9. See 1 BARON DE MONTESQUIEU, SPIRIT OF THE LAWS 151–62 (Thomas 
Nugent trans., 1900). 
10. See 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 
245 (1765). 
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writings were often referred to as the “political bibles”11 of the 
Framers. Each of these writers viewed what Locke described as the 
business of “war, peace, leagues and alliances”12 to be the province of 
the king, prince, or magistrate—the “executive” officer of the 
government. 
How do we know the Founding Fathers embraced this view? 
Because they repeatedly told us so in clear terms. Writing in June 
1789, Representative James Madison explained: “[T]he Executive 
power being in general terms vested in the President, all powers of an 
Executive nature, not particularly taken away must belong to that 
department. . . .”13 The following year, Madison’s friend and mentor 
Thomas Jefferson wrote in a memorandum to President Washington: 
The Constitution . . . has declared that “the Executive power 
shall be vested in the President,” submitting only special 
articles of it to a negative by the Senate. . . . 
The transaction of business with foreign nations is Executive 
altogether; it belongs, then to the head of that department, 
except as to such portions of it as are specially submitted to the 
Senate. Exceptions are to be construed strictly.14 
Those “[e]xceptions” included the Senate’s negatives on treaties 
and diplomatic appointments, as well as the power of Congress to 
“declare War.”15 President Washington discussed Jefferson’s 
memorandum with Chief Justice John Jay and Representative 
Madison, recording in his diary three days later that both agreed with 
Jefferson that, beyond these enumerated exceptions, the Senate had 
“no Constitutional right to interfere” in the business of diplomacy, 
“all the rest being Executive and vested in the President by the 
Constitution.”16 
Jefferson’s chief rival in Washington’s cabinet, Treasury Secretary 
Alexander Hamilton, took an identical position in 1793: 
The general doctrine then of our constitution is, that the 
Executive Power of the Nation is vested in the President; 
11. See, e.g., QUINCY WRIGHT, CONTROL OF AMERICAN FOREIGN RELATIONS 
263 (1922). 
12. LOCKE, supra note 8, ¶ 146. 
13. James Madison to Edmund Pendleton, June 21, 1789, in 5 WRITINGS OF 
JAMES MADISON 405–06 (1904). 
14. 16 PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 378–79 (Julian P. Boyd, ed. 1961) 
(emphasis added). 
15. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11. 
16. IV DIARIES OF GEORGE WASHINGTON 1748–1799, at 128 (1925). 
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subject only to the exceptions and qualifications which are 
expressed in the instrument. . . .  
It deserves to be remarked, that as the participation of the 
Senate in the making of treaties, and the power of the 
Legislature to declare war, are exceptions out of the general 
“Executive Power” vested in the President, they are to be 
construed strictly—and ought to be extended no further than is 
essential to their execution.17 
Yet another key Jefferson rival, Chief Justice John Marshall, 
reaffirmed the president’s independent constitutional responsibilities 
in the field of foreign affairs in perhaps the most famous of all 
Supreme Court decisions, Marbury v. Madison, when he wrote: 
By the constitution of the United States, the President is 
invested with certain important political powers, in the exercise 
of which he is to use his own discretion, and is accountable only 
to his country in his political character, and to his own 
conscience . . . .  
[W]hatever opinion may be entertained of the manner in which 
executive discretion may be used, still there exists, and can 
exist, no power to control that discretion. The subjects are 
political. They respect the nation, not individual rights, and 
being entrusted to the executive, the decision of the executive is 
conclusive.18 
Marshall illustrated this principle by mentioning the Secretary of 
Foreign Affairs (later retitled Secretary of State) and declaring that 
the acts of that officer “can never be examinable by the courts.”19 As 
Professor Wright observed in 1922, “when the constitutional 
convention gave ‘executive power’ to the President, the foreign 
relations power was the essential element in the grant. . . .”20 
In addition to understanding the vast grant of “executive Power” 
to the president with respect to foreign affairs, we must also recognize 
that the Constitutional Framers intentionally limited the authority of 
17. XV THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 39, 42 (Harold C. Syrett ed., 
1969) (emphasis altered). 
18. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 165–66 (1803).  
19. Id. at 166. 
20. WRIGHT, supra note 11, at 147. In his 1972 classic, Foreign Affairs and 
the Constitution, Columbia Law School Professor Louis Henkin 
observed: “The executive power . . . was not defined because it was well 
understood by the Framers raised on Locke, Montesquieu and 
Blackstone.” LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION 
43 (1972). 
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the legislature over the business of war. In the original draft, Congress 
was empowered “to make War”—giving it essentially all powers 
related to war beyond the actual command of troops, as had been the 
case under the Articles of Confederation.21 But on August 17, 1787, 
James Madison moved to amend the language to give Congress only 
the power “to declare war.”22 After Rufus King observed that “make” 
war might give Congress some role in the conduct of war, which was 
“an executive function,” the vote of Connecticut was changed to ay 
and Madison’s motion prevailed with but a single negative vote.23 
Soon thereafter, a motion to involve Congress in decisions to conclude 
wars (“to give the Legislature power of peace”) was unanimously 
rejected.24 
The concept of a “declaration of war” was a term of art from the 
law of nations, and such instruments were only considered necessary 
when a nation was about to launch an all-out “aggressive” attack 
against a nation with which it was at peace. The Framers understood 
the concepts of “perfect” and “imperfect” war, and also of force short 
of war.25  
Throughout our history, Congress has formally “declared war” 
eleven times involving five wars.26 But as the Supreme Court noted in 
21. See ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781, art. IX, para. 1 (“The United 
States in Congress assembled, shall have the sole and exclusive right and 
power of determining on peace and war. . . .”). 
22. 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 318 (Max Farrand 
ed., 2d ed. 1937). 
23. See id. at 319. 
24. See id.  
25. As Justice Washington noted in the 1800 case of Bas v. Tingy: 
It may, I believe, be safely laid down, that every contention by 
force between two nations, in external matters, under the 
authority of their respective governments, is not only war, but 
public war. If it be declared in form, it is called solemn, and is 
of the perfect kind; because one whole nation is at war with 
another whole nation; and all the members of the nation 
declaring war, are authorised to commit hostilities against all 
the members of the other, in every place, and under every 
circumstance . . . . 
 
But hostilities may subsist between two nations more confined 
in its nature and extent; being limited as to places, persons, and 
things; and this is more properly termed imperfect war . . . . 
 Bas v. Tingy, 4 U.S. 37, 40–41 (1800) (emphasis added). 
26. In addition to the War of 1812, The Mexican-American War, and the 
Spanish-American War, Congress declared war against Germany and 
Austria-Hungary during World War I and against Japan, Germany, 
Italy, Bulgaria, Hungary, and Romania during World War II. 
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Verdugo-Urquidez, “The United States frequently employs Armed 
Forces outside this country—over 200 times in our history—for the 
protection of American citizens or national security.”27 To mention 
one early example, President Thomas Jefferson ordered two-thirds of 
the new American Navy to sail for the Mediterranean in March 1801 
with orders to protect our commerce and sink and burn the ships of 
any Barbary States that they should learn had declared war on 
America, without even formally informing Congress until his 
December 8, 1801, State of the Union report—and the Annals of 
Congress reveal no expression of concern that the president should 
first have obtained prior legislative sanction.28 
The great publicists in international law, like Hugo Grotius and 
Emmerich de Vattel, noted that formal declarations of war were not 
necessary when a nation was, as Grotius put it, “repelling an invasion, 
or seeking to punish the actual author of some crime.”29 Vattel added 
that “[h]e who is attacked and only wages defensive war, needs not to 
make any hostile declaration. . . .”30 Other scholars made similar 
statements.31 
Many things have changed in the 225 years since the Constitution 
was drafted, and some of the powers vested in Congress have little 
contemporary relevance. Article I, Section 8, Clause 11 of the 
Constitution vests in Congress the powers to “declare War, [and] 
grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal,”32 but I would submit that 
both are now anachronisms. The use of “Letters of Marque and 
Reprisal”33 was outlawed by the 1856 Declaration of Paris,34 and they 
27. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 273 (1990). 
28. For information on this operation, see Robert F. Turner, President 
Thomas Jefferson and the Barbary Pirates, in PIRACY AND MARITIME 
CRIME: HISTORICAL AND MODERN CASE STUDIES 157, 162−63 (Bruce A. 
Elleman et al. eds. 2010). 
29. HUGO GROTIUS, THE LAW OF WAR AND PEACE 289 (Louise R. Loomis, 
trans., 1949). 
30. EMMERICH DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS OR PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW 
OF NATURE, APPLIED TO THE CONDUCT AND AFFAIRS OF NATIONS AND 
SOVEREIGNS 316 (Joseph Chitty ed., 7th ed. 1849).  
31. See Robert F. Turner, War and the Forgotten Executive Power Clause 
of the Constitution 34 VA. J.INT’L L. 903, 906−10 (1994) (discussing 
how international scholars, such as Franciscus de Victoria, Alberico 
Gentili, Richard Zouche, Samuel von Pufendorf, Cornelius Van 
Bynkershoek, Christian Wolff, Jean Jacques Burlamqui, and James 
Kent, have interpreted the power and obligation to declare war). 
32. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11. 
33. Letters of Marque and Reprisal authorized private ship owners to 
capture ships belonging to an enemy or its subjects and were widely 
used by the United States during the Revolutionary War and the War 
of 1812. It has been suggested that this clause gives Congress a negative 
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have not been granted by the United States since the War of 1812. 
Similarly, the types of all-out “offensive” (i.e., “aggressive”) wars 
historically associated with formal declarations of war were outlawed 
in principle by the 1928 Kellogg-Briand Treaty35 and again by the UN 
Charter in 1945.36 No country in the world has issued a declaration of 
war in more than 65 years. 
However, this is not to suggest that the UN Charter or the 
Declaration of Paris have altered our Constitution in any manner. If 
an American president concluded that it was useful to launch an 
aggressive “perfect” war, or to authorize private ship owners to use 
armed force against the ships of nationals of a foreign nation on the 
high seas, then Congress would certainly still retain its negative over 
either action. But if the United States respects its treaty 
commitments and the rule of law, such behavior will not occur and 
the once important powers of Congress to declare war and grant 
Letters of Marque and Reprisal will not come into play. 
Does this mean that Congress no longer has any role in the 
business of war? It does not. To the contrary, the Commander-in-
Chief Power by itself is totally conditional upon prior legislative 
action. The president has no “army” or “navy” to command until 
they are raised or provided by statute,37 and no money is available to 
pay salaries or purchase weapons or other supplies without 
“Appropriations made by Law. . . .”38 No major prolonged military 
engagement is likely to prevail without additional funds and forces 
from Congress, and even without a constitutional need for a 
declaration of war, presidents usually and wisely seek some sort of 
legislative sanction before committing U.S. forces to major combat 
activities. Since World War II, this has often been done by joint 
over uses of force short of war, but that position is not sound. See 
Robert F. Turner, Covert War and the Constitution: A Response, 5 J. 
NAT’L SEC. L. & POL’Y 409, 415−19 (2012).  
34. See Declaration Respecting Maritime Law, Apr. 16, 1856, LXI B.S.P. 
155, 155˗58.  
35. Treaty Between the United States and Other Powers Providing for the 
Renunciation of War as an Instrument of National Policy, Aug. 27, 
1928, 46 Stat. 2343, T.S. No. 796, 94 L.N.T.S. 57 (1928). 
36. See U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4 (“All Members shall refrain in their 
international relations from the threat or use of force against the 
territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any 
other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.”).  
37. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 12–13.  
38. Id. art. 1, § 9 (“No Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in 
Consequence of Appropriations made by Law; and a regular Statement 
and Account of the Receipts and Expenditures of all public Money shall 
be published from time to time.”). 
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resolutions39 (the same legislative instrument historically used to 
declare war) styled in more recent years as “Authorizations for the 
Use of Military Force” or “AUMFs.”40 
Congress has every right to refuse to approve requested 
appropriations for forces or supplies, and thus can indirectly 
undermine virtually any major commitment of U.S. military forces 
into hostilities. But a “narrowly construed”41 power to “declare War” 
does not carry with it legislative authority to prevent the president 
from using whatever military Congress creates to safeguard the 
national against both foreign threats and acts of aggression, or to see 
the laws (including the UN Charter) “faithfully executed.”42  
Put simply, the power “to declare War” does not equate to the 
power to limit “the introduction of United States Armed Forces into 
hostilities, or into situations where imminent involvement in 
hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances”43 as asserted in 
the War Powers Resolution. Particularly outrageous is Section 2(c)(3) 
of that statute, which pretends to limit the president’s constitutional 
power to protect American civilians abroad or on the high seas. 
Section 2(c) reads: 
(c) The constitutional powers of the President as Commander-
in-Chief to introduce United States Armed Forces into 
hostilities, or into situations where imminent involvement in 
hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances, are 
exercised only pursuant to (1) a declaration of war, (2) specific 
statutory authorization, or (3) a national emergency created by 
39. For the texts and associated citations of various declarations of war and 
AUMFs, see NATIONAL SECURITY LAW DOCUMENTS 867–97 (John Norton 
Moore, Guy B. Roberts & Robert F. Turner eds., 2d ed. 2006). 
40. See, e.g., id. at 888–97. For useful background on declarations of war 
and AUMFs, see generally JENNIFER K. ELSEA & RICHARD F. GRIMMETT, 
CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL31133, DECLARATIONS OF WAR AND 
AUTHORIZATIONS FOR THE USE OF MILITARY FORCE: HISTORICAL 
BACKGROUND AND LEGAL IMPLICATIONS (2007). 
41. See supra text accompanying notes 13–17.  
42. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3 (“[The President] . . . shall take Care that the 
Laws be faithfully executed . . . .”). That this was intended to empower 
the President to enforce the nation’s treaty obligations is apparent both 
from statements by Hamilton and John Marshall. For example, in his 
first Pacificus essay, Hamilton wrote: “The President is the 
constitutional EXECUTOR of the laws. Our Treaties and the laws of 
Nations form a part of the law of the land. He who is to execute the 
laws must first judge for himself of their meaning.” HAMILTON, supra 
note 17, at 43. See also the 1800 statement by Representative John 
Marshall quoted infra text accompanying note 76. 
43. H.R.J. Res. 542, Pub. L. 93-148, § 2(a), 87 Stat. 555 (1973) (codified at 
50 U.S.C. 1541(a)).  
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attack upon the United States, its territories or possessions, or 
its armed forces.44 
In a December 1984 debate with Senator Jacob Javits—the 
principal sponsor of the War Powers Resolution—before the American 
Branch of the International Law Association, I noted that the 
exclusion of civilians from the final clause of this provision was clearly 
unconstitutional. To my surprise, during his rebuttal the Senator 
conceded the point, explaining that the Senate had tried to get the 
House to include a reference to civilians in this clause but had failed. 
(Put differently, after failing to get House approval, the Senators 
voted for legislation they understood infringed upon the constitutional 
powers of the president, despite their oath of office to “support” the 
Constitution.45) 
Another highly respected liberal member of the Senate, who 
would go on to serve as Majority Leader and receive the Nobel Peace 
Prize, also recognized both the statute’s constitutional infirmities and 
its practical effect of undermining U.S. national security. During a 
1988 Senate floor colloquy in which he, Senator Bobby Byrd, Senator 
Sam Nunn, and Senate Armed Services Committee chairman John 
Warner took turns criticizing the 1973 statute, Senator George 
Mitchell explained: 
[T]he War Powers resolution does not work, because it oversteps 
the constitutional bounds on Congress’ power to control the 
Armed Forces in situations short of war and because it 
potentially undermines our ability to effectively defend our 
national interests. 
By enabling Congress to require—by its own inaction—the 
withdrawal of troops from a situation of hostilities, the 
resolution unduly restricts the authority granted by the 
Constitution to the President as Commander in Chief. . . . 
Although portrayed as an effort “to fulfill—not to alter, amend 
or adjust—the intent of the framers of the U.S. Constitution,” 
the War Powers Resolution actually expands Congress’ 
authority beyond the power to declare war to the power to limit 
troop deployment in situations short of war. . . . 
The War Powers Resolution therefore threatens not only the 
delicate balance of power established by the Constitution. It 
44. Id. § 2(c)(3). 
45. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 3. 
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potentially undermines America’s ability to effectively defend 
our national security.46 
On February 29, 1996, it was my honor to take part in a debate 
on Capitol Hill under the sponsorship of the Center for National 
Security Law on the proposition that the War Powers Resolution 
should be repealed. I was paired in the affirmative with the late House 
Judiciary Committee Chairman Henry Hyde, and our opponents were 
former House Foreign Affairs and Intelligence committees chairman 
Lee Hamilton and Dr. Louis Fisher of the Library of Congress. As the 
debate unfolded, I was pleasantly shocked to hear that neither 
Representative Hamilton nor my old friend Lou Fisher was willing to 
actually defend the War Powers Resolution. Shortly thereafter, Lou 
co-authored an article calling for the statute’s repeal,47 and in 2008 
Representative Hamilton served on the bipartisan National War 
Powers Commission, which unanimously concluded that the War 
Powers Resolution was unconstitutional and should be repealed.48 
III. The War Powers Resolution is Unnecessary 
There is a popular belief today that the 1973 War Powers 
Resolution was made necessary by “imperial”49 presidents who 
dragged the nation kicking and screaming into unpopular wars in 
Korea and Vietnam against the will of Congress and the American 
people. But both charges are patently false. As I have discussed 
elsewhere,50 when the Korean War broke out in June of 1950 
President Truman could not have played it more by the book. He 
instructed the Department of State to draft an AUMF for Congress to 
consider and repeatedly asked to address a joint session of Congress. 
He personally met with the joint congressional leadership twice during 
the week following the invasion of South Korea, and he spoke 
separately with Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Tom 
Connally (who had helped draft the UN Charter) and Senate Majority 
Leader Scott Lucas—and both assured him that he had authority to 
act without legislative sanction and urged him to “stay away” from 
46. See 134 CONG. REC. S6177–78 (daily ed. May 19, 1988) (statement of 
Sen. George Mitchell). 
47. Louis Fisher & David Gray Adler, The War Powers Resolution: Time to 
Say Goodbye, 113 POL. SCI. Q. 1, 1 (1998). 
48. NATIONAL WAR POWERS COMMISSION REPORT 23, 30 (2008). This 
document and other materials about the National War Powers 
Commission can be found on the web at http://millercenter.org/ 
policy/commissions/warpowers. 
49. See ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENT viii (1973). 
50. Robert F. Turner, Truman, Korea, and the Constitution, 19 HARV. J. L. 
& PUB. POL’Y 533, 541, 565–67 (1996). 
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Congress. So Truman agreed not to push for an AUMF. But 
statements by legislators and public opinion polls confirmed that 
sending U.S. troops to fight in Korea initially had strong bipartisan 
support in Congress and among the American people.51  
In 1955, the Senate consented to the ratification of the Southeast 
Asia Collective Defense Treaty, creating the South East Asia Treaty 
Organization (SEATO), with but a single dissenting vote—
committing the United States to come to the defense of South 
Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia. The commitment was reaffirmed by a 
joint resolution (statute) in August 1964 that declared: 
The United States regards as vital to its national interest and to 
world peace the maintenance of international peace and security 
in southeast Asia. Consonant with the Constitution of the 
United States and the Charter of the United Nations and in 
accordance with its obligations under the Southeast Asia 
Collective Defense Treaty, the United States is, therefore, 
prepared, as the President determines, to take all necessary 
steps, including the use of armed force, to assist any member or 
protocol state of the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty 
requesting assistance in defense of its freedom.52 
If there was any doubt about whether Congress was authorizing 
the president to take the nation to war by that statute, it should have 
been dispelled both by the clear and unambiguous language of the 
statute and by this exchange between the majority and minority floor 
leaders in the debate, Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman 
J. William Fulbright and Ranking Republican John Sherman Cooper: 
51. For a more detailed discussion of President Truman’s efforts to gain 
legislative sanction for the Korean War, see id. 
52. Southeast Asian Resolution, Pub. L. No. 88–508, § 2, 78 Stat. 384 
(1964) (emphasis added); repealed by Pub. L. 91-672 § 12 (1971). This 
resolution is often referred to as the “Gulf of Tonkin Resolution,” but 
was clearly addressing a history of North Vietnamese aggression that 
preceded the relatively minor incident on August 2, 1964, that North 
Vietnamese General Vo Nguyen Giap later admitted to former U.S. 
Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara did occur. See, e.g., David K. 
Shipler, Robert McNamara and the Ghosts of Vietnam, N.Y. TIMES 
MAG. (Aug. 10, 1997), http://www.nytimes.com/1997/08/10/magazine/ 
robert-mcnamara-and-the-ghosts-of-vietnam.html?pagewanted= 
all&src=pm. Since the war ended, Hanoi has admitted that its leaders 
made a decision on May 19, 1959 to “liberate” South Vietnam by armed 
force and began building the Ho Chi Minh Trail through Laos and 
Cambodia to send troops and supplies into South Vietnam for that 
purpose. See, e.g., The Legendary Ho Chi Minh Trail, VIETNAM 
COURIER (Hanoi), May 1984, at 9.  
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Mr. COOPER. Then, looking ahead, if the President decided 
that it was necessary to use such force as could lead into war, 
we will give that authority by this resolution? 
Mr. FULBRIGHT. That is the way I would interpret it.53 
The Vietnam War (or, more correctly, the Indochina War54) was 
not in the slightest sense a “presidential war” that lacked the support 
of Congress or the American people. True, like all American wars, the 
commander-in-chief and his military subordinates were solely 
responsible for its conduct.55 But Congress formally authorized “the 
use of armed force” by a combined vote of 504 to 2, a 99.6% majority, 
and appropriated funds for several years by overwhelming 
majorities.56 As for public support, during the month surrounding 
53. 110 CONG. REC. 18,049 (1964) (emphasis added). 
54. The operative language of the Southeast Asian Resolution did not even 
mention “The Republic of Vietnam” or “South Vietnam” (as it was 
more colloquially known), but rather authorized the President to use 
armed force to defend the “Protocol States” of the SEATO treaty—
which were Laos, Cambodia, and [South] Vietnam. This reality was 
ignored (presumably out of ignorance) by those who protested as illegal 
President Nixon’s decision to send U.S. troops into Cambodia in 1970. 
As someone who was in Vietnam at the time (and the following year as 
well), I can confirm that the operation was a tremendous military 
victory for the South Vietnamese and American forces, and for all 
practical purposes broke the back of the Viet Cong in the populated 
areas of the Mekong Delta. 
55. Writing for the plurality in Ex parte Milligan, Chief Justice Chase 
observed “neither can the President, in war more than in peace, intrude 
upon the proper authority of Congress, nor Congress upon the proper 
authority of the President. Both are servants of the people, whose will is 
expressed in the fundamental law. Congress cannot direct the conduct of 
campaigns. . . .” 71 U.S. 2, 88 (1866) (emphasis added). My old friend 
Dr. Louis Fisher used to downplay this language on the basis of it being 
but a plurality opinion, but the language was subsequently quoted with 
approval by Justice Stevens writing for the Court majority in Hamdan 
v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 591–92 (2006). 
56. If anything, the record shows that Congress dragged President Johnson 
into the war. Rather than approving his request for $125 million for 
Vietnam when LBJ submitted the 1964 Southeast Asia Resolution, 
Congress on its own initiative provided $400 million. Eight months 
later, Congress provided another $700 million for the war by a vote of 
408 to 7 in the House and 88 to 3 in the Senate. In 1966, a $13 billion 
supplemental appropriation for Vietnam cleared the House 389 to 3 and 
the Senate 87 to 2. And in 1967, when hundreds of thousands of 
American soldiers were clearly involved in a serious war in Vietnam, a 
$12 billion Vietnam supplemental appropriation passed the House 385 to 
11 and the Senate 77 to 3 (a combined margin of greater than 30 to 1). 
ROBERT F. TURNER, REPEALING THE WAR POWERS RESOLUTION: 
RESTORING THE RULE OF LAW IN U.S. FOREIGN POLICY 21 (1991). 
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LBJ’s air attacks against North Vietnamese bases and enactment of 
the Southeast Asia Resolution, LBJ’s approval rating in the Gallup 
Polls increased from 42% to 72%—an unprecedented 58% jump in a 
single month—and the Gallup organization attributed the rise to 
LBJ’s strong stand in Vietnam.57 Professor John E. Mueller observed 
that “support for the war in Vietnam rose very considerably as 
American troops joined the fighting during the last half of 1965,” 
when polls revealed that supporters of the war outnumbered 
opponents by a margin of greater than three-to-one.58 
In March 1966, Senator Wayne Morse (D-Oregon)—one of the 
two members of the Senate to vote against the Southeast Asia 
Resolution (both of whom were defeated in their next reelection 
bids)—introduced a resolution that would have repealed the 1964 
statute authorizing the war. Speaking in opposition to the Morse 
Amendment (which was tabled by a large majority vote), Senator 
Jacob Javits (R-New York) declared: “It is a fact, whether we like it 
or not, that by virtue of having acted on the resolution of August 
1964, we are a party to present policy.”59 Later that same year, when 
the House of Delegates of the American Bar Association approved a 
lengthy legal memorandum drafted by my friend and colleague, 
Professor John Norton Moore (with whom I co-founded the Center for 
National Security Law at the University of Virginia School of Law 
more than three decades ago) declaring the war to be lawful under 
international and U.S. constitutional law, Senator Javits inserted a 
lengthy excerpt from the memo in the Congressional Record and 
declared: 
Mr. President, now, for the first time, we have an authoritative 
analysis of the legal basis for U.S. assistance to the Republic of 
Vietnam. In my own thinking there can no longer be any doubt 
about the legality of our assistance to the people of South 
Vietnam in view of the report to be distributed today by the 
American Bar Association. . . . I have never doubted the 
lawfulness of the U.S. assistance to the Republic of Vietnam. 
Today, it is my privilege to present to the Senate and the 
American people a document, which, I believe, supports this 
proposition beyond any reasonable doubt.60 
At the time, the American people strongly supported the war. 
Seven years later, public opinion had shifted and Senator Javits went 
57. ALBERT H. CANTRIL, THE AMERICAN PEOPLE, VIET-NAM, AND THE 
PRESIDENCY 2–3 (1970). 
58. JOHN E. MUELLER, WAR, PRESIDENTS AND PUBLIC OPINION 53–54 (1973). 
59. 112 CONG. REC. 4,374 (1966) (emphasis added). 
60. Id. at 13,870. 
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with the flow. He introduced the War Powers Resolution, explaining 
that it was designed to prevent “future Vietnams” and declared on 
the Senate floor: 
The War Powers Act would assure that any future decision to 
commit the United States to any warmaking must be shared in 
by the Congress to be lawful. . . .  
By enumerating the war powers of Congress so explicitly and 
extensively in article I, section 8, the framers of the 
Constitution took special care to assure the Congress of a 
concurring role in any measures that would commit the nation 
to war. Modern practice, culminating [in] the Vietnam war . . . 
has upset the balance of the Constitution in this respect.61 
Put simply, the War Powers Resolution was a fraud upon the 
American people. Voters were angry about the unpopular war, and 
members of Congress found it in their interest to misrepresent the 
facts and pretend that they (and their predecessors a decade earlier) 
had nothing to do with sending U.S. forces to fight and die in what 
by 1972 was widely seen as an unwinnable quagmire without clear 
purpose. (The fact that the military war had largely been won62 by 
that point was irrelevant—it was the public perceptions that would 
influence the next elections.) In fairness, by 1973 some of the more 
junior legislators may have honestly believed that version of history, 
but Senator Jacob Javits—one of the most intelligent members of the 
Senate—clearly knew better. 
Indeed, the irrelevance of the War Powers Resolution to the 
conflict in Indochina is apparent by a simple reading of Section 2 of 
the statute (quoted above63), which recognizes the president’s legal 
authority to commit U.S. armed forces to hostilities pursuant to 
“specific statutory authorization. . . .” That’s precisely what the 1964 
Southeast Asia Resolution was. Put simply, had the War Powers 
61. 119 CONG. REC. 1,394 (1973). 
62. As Yale History Professor John Lewis Gaddis (often described as the 
Dean of American Diplomatic Historians) observed writing in Foreign 
Affairs in 2005, “Historians now acknowledge that American 
counterinsurgency operations in Vietnam were succeeding during the 
final years of that conflict; the problem was that support for the war 
had long since crumbled at home.” John Lewis Gaddis, Grand Strategy 
in the Second Term, FOREIGN AFF., Jan.—Feb. 2005, at 2, 9. As 
someone who studied the war at the time and made frequent trips to 
Vietnam between 1968 and the 1975 evacuation (I was the last 
congressional staff member to be evacuated), I strongly agree with 
Professor Gaddis’ assessment, as did most of my colleagues who followed 
the war closely at the time. 
63. See supra text accompanying notes 43–44.  
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Resolution been in force in 1964, it would have had zero impact upon 
the decision to commit U.S. armed forces to war in Indochina. 
Before concluding this section of my paper, it may be useful to 
address the constitutional role of Congress in the event of a UN 
Security Council decision to authorize the use of armed force pursuant 
to Chapter VII of the Charter.64 On the eve of Operation Desert 
Storm, I was a witness before the Senate Judiciary Committee when a 
discussion arose about possibly impeaching President George H. W. 
Bush if he sought to implement Security Council Resolution 67865 and 
resist Saddam Hussein’s brutal aggression without first getting an 
AUMF from Congress. (What a useful signal to send to our enemies 
at a time when the world community had united in an effort to deter 
continued international aggression.) President Obama’s 2011 decision 
to use U.S. armed force in and over the territory of Libya pursuant to 
Security Council Resolution 197366 raised similar questions. 
One thing is clear. The Senators who in 1945 consented to the 
ratification of the UN Charter, and the members of both chambers of 
Congress who overwhelmingly approved the U.N. Participation Act 
(UNPA)67 later that year, did not envision a role for Congress in the 
authorization of U.S. combat operations to enforce a Chapter VII 
decision of the Security Council. 
Indeed, the unanimous report of the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee recommending consenting to ratification of the Charter—
in language later quoted with approval by the unanimous report of 
the House Foreign Affairs Committee on the UNPA—declared: 
Preventative or enforcement action by these [U.S.] forces upon 
the order of the Security Council would not be an act of war 
but would be international action for the preservation of the 
peace and for the purpose of preventing war. Consequently, the 
provisions of the Charter do not affect the exclusive power of 
the Congress to declare war. 
The committee feels that a reservation or other congressional 
action . . . would also violate the spirit of the United States 
Constitution under which the President has well-established 
powers and obligations to use our armed forces without specific 
approval of Congress.68 
64. U.N. CHARTER arts. 39–51 (providing the authority of the Security 
Council to authorize the use of military force and related matters). 
65. S.C. Res. 678, U.N. Doc. S/RES/0678 (Nov. 29, 1990). 
66. S.C. Res. 1973, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1973 (Mar. 17, 2011). 
67. United Nations Participation Act, 22 U.S.C. § 287(c) (1946). 
68. Turner, Truman, Korea and the Constitution, supra note 50, at 551 
(quoting H.R. REP. NO. 79-1383, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 7–8 (1945)).  
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The House Foreign Affairs Committee’s UNPA report also 
explained: 
The basic decision of the Senate in advising and consenting to 
ratification of the Charter resulted in the undertaking by this 
country of various obligations which will actually [be] carried 
out by and under the authority of the President as the Chief 
Executive, diplomatic, and military officer of the Government. 
Among such obligations is that of supplying armed forces to the 
Security Council concerning which provision is made in section 
6. . . . 
[T]he ratification of the Charter resulted in the vesting in the 
executive branch of the power and obligation to fulfill the 
commitments assumed by the United States thereunder. . . .69 
Under the Constitution, the president is empowered and charged 
to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed. . . .”70 Under the 
Supremacy Clause, “all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under 
the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the 
Land . . . .”71 Thus, treaties are a part of the “Laws” the president is 
obligated (and empowered) to faithfully execute.  
This is not a new theory. Before he became our third Chief 
Justice, John Marshall served a term as a Federalist Representative to 
Congress from Virginia. During the 1800 House debate over the 
Jonathan Robbins affair, Marshall argued that President Adams had 
been right in surrendering an accused deserter found in South 
Carolina to the British pursuant to the extradition provision of the 
Jay Treaty without involving the judiciary: 
The President is the sole organ of the nation in its external 
relations, and its sole representative with foreign nations. . . . 
He possesses the whole Executive power. He holds and directs 
the force of the nation. Of consequence, any act to be performed 
by the force of the nation is to be performed through him. . . . 
The treaty, which is a law, enjoins the performance of a 
69. H.R. REP. NO. 79-1383, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1945) 
70. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3. 
71. Id. art. VI (“This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States 
which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or 
which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be 
the supreme Law of the Land . . . .” (emphasis added)). While there has 
been some confusion about this phraseology, and some have speculated 
that it might have allowed treaties to violate the Constitution, the 
actual explanation is that the United States had already entered into 
important treaties when the Constitution was written and the Framers 
did not wish to create uncertainties about their validity by requiring 
that treaties be made only “pursuant” to the Constitution.  
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particular object. The person who is to perform this object is 
marked out by the Constitution, since the person is named who 
conducts the foreign intercourse, and is to take care that the 
laws be faithfully executed.72 
However, when the 1945 UN Participation Act was being debated 
in the Senate, not everyone was anxious to see the president 
empowered to order U.S. military forces into combat based upon a 
decision by a group of foreigners on the UN Security Council 
(although, in fairness, those “foreigners” could not authorize any use 
of force over the objection of the American representative to the 
Security Council). Isolationist Senator Burton Wheeler (D-Montana) 
tried to pull some of the Security Council’s teeth by an amendment to 
the UNPA requiring affirmative authorization by the Congress before 
U.S. forces could actually be sent into combat to enforce a Security 
Council decision. The Wheeler Amendment was very clear in its 
purpose: 
[T]he President shall have no authority, to make available to 
the Security Council any armed forces to enable the Security 
Council to take action under article 42 of said charter, unless 
the Congress has by appropriate act or joint resolution 
authorized the President to make such forces available . . . in 
the specific case in which the Council proposed to take action.73 
The Wheeler Amendment was soundly rejected by a bipartisan 
margin of greater than seven-to-one, receiving only nine affirmative 
votes,74 and the following year Senator Wheeler could not even get his 
party’s nomination to run for reelection.  
The unanimous views of the Senate and House foreign affairs 
committees in 1945 that no congressional authorization was necessary 
for the president to use American military forces to enforce a Security 
Council resolution under Chapter VII were fully consistent with the 
original understanding of the Constitution. Formal declarations of war 
were universally recognized by scholars of the law of nations in the 
late eighteenth century to be unnecessary when a nation was using 
force defensively, which is precisely the reason the Security Council 
authorized the use of force in Korea, Kuwait, and Libya.  
There remains the issue of whether the War Powers Resolution 
has in any way altered the president’s power to carry out Security 
Council Chapter VII resolutions. After all, the Supreme Court has 
consistently held treaties and statutes to be of equal dignity, and 
72. 10 ANNALS OF CONG. 613–14 (1800). 
73. Turner, Truman, Korea, and the Constitution, supra note 50, at 554 
(quoting 91 CONG. REC. 7,989 (1970)).  
74. Id. (quoting 91 CONG. REC. 11,405 (1970)).  
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when the two cannot be reconciled the Court gives effect to the most 
recent expression of the sovereign will.75 It follows that if the 
pronouncements of the Senate and House committees were but 
“interpretations” of authority given to the President by a 1945 treaty, 
a 1973 statute like the War Powers Resolution would prevail—
provided that the more recent statute were constitutional.76 
I have already argued that the War Powers Resolution is 
unconstitutional, and that the Constitution clearly vested in the 
commander-in-chief all military powers not clearly granted to 
Congress or the Senate. It seems also clear that the Senate and 
House77 believed they were interpreting the Constitution rather than 
merely the Charter, as they referred to the “Constitution under which 
the President has well-established powers and obligations to use our 
armed forces without specific approval of Congress.”78 
Every administration from Richard Nixon to George W. Bush—
five Republicans and two Democrats—has taken the view that the 
War Powers Resolution is unconstitutional. Assuming that is true, 
President Obama did not need statutory authorization to participate 
in the UN/NATO operation that led to the overthrow and death of 
Muammar Qaddafi. However, the situation becomes more complicated 
because the Obama Administration has refused to declare the War 
Powers Resolution to be unconstitutional. This has placed the 
president in a very difficult situation, because if the 1973 statute is 
constitutional then the president is clearly guilty of violating the law. 
Interestingly, in his June 15, 2012, report to Congress, President 
Obama asserted he was reporting not “pursuant to” but merely 
“consistent with”79 the War Powers Resolution—embracing the 
language originated during the Ford Administration and used by 
every subsequent president to make it clear that by submitting 
reports the executive was not acknowledging any legal duty to report 
under the unconstitutional statute. The White House report goes on 
to explain that the U.S. role had been a limited one, including: 
75. See, e.g., Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190 (1888). 
76. As Chief Justice John Marshall declared in Marbury, “an act of the 
legislature, repugnant to the constitution, is void . . . .” Marbury v. 
Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803). 
77. Note that the House report quoted with approval the earlier Senate 
report. 
78. See supra text accompanying note 50.  
79. Letter from President Barack Obama to Speaker of the House, 
Presidential Letter—2012 War Powers Resolution 6-Month Report 
(June 15, 2012), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-
office/2012/06/15/presidential-letter-2012-war-powers-resolution-6-
month-report. 
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(3) since April 23, precision strikes by unmanned aerial vehicles 
against a limited set of clearly defined targets in support of the 
NATO led coalition’s efforts. . . . With the exception of 
operations to rescue the crew of a U.S. aircraft on March 21, 
2011 . . . the United States has deployed no ground forces to 
Libya.”80 
Congress did not include a definition of “hostilities” in the War 
Powers Resolution. Perhaps the best definition to date is from the 
very able University of Texas Professor Robert Chesney, who 
suggested the test might be “whether U.S. forces have been 
authorized to use lethal force other than on a self-defense basis.”81 But 
it is difficult to imagine any definition that is consistent with the clear 
spirit and intent of Congress when the statute was enacted that 
would permit U.S. military aircraft to fly over the territory of a 
foreign nation and fire missiles to kill its soldiers. 
Particularly amusing, for some of us who have tilled in this 
vineyard for the past four decades, was the testimony to the Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee by State Department Legal Adviser 
Harold Koh—who previously served as Dean of Yale Law School and 
for the previous two decades was the strongest academic champion of 
the War Powers Resolution. When the Attorney General, White 
House Counsel, and Department of Defense General Counsel all 
reportedly concluded that legislative authorization was necessary, it 
fell to Legal Adviser Koh to defend the Libyan operation. After 
quoting statements by predecessors from the Ford and Reagan 
Administrations (which he had historically dismissed82), he told the 
Committee: “I continue nearly four decades of dialogue between 
Congress and Legal Advisers . . . regarding the Executive Branch’s 
legal position on war powers.”83  
Noting that past presidents had largely ignored the War Powers 
Resolution, Legal Adviser Koh cautioned the Senators about “narrow 
parsing of dictionary definitions” so as “to avoid unduly hampering 
80. Id. 
81. Robert Chesney, Will Congress Amend the WPR by Defining 
“Hostilities”?, LAWFARE (June 16, 2011, 12:04 PM), http://www. 
lawfareblog.com/2011/06/will-congress-amend-the-wpr-by-defining-
hostilities/. I highly recommend Lawfare to anyone interested in the 
field of national security law. 
82. For a statement of Professor Koh’s views on the War Powers 
Resolution, see, e.g., HAROLD HONGJU KOH, THE NATIONAL SECURITY 
CONSTITUTION (1990). 
83. Libya and War Powers: Hearing Before the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee, 112th Cong. 7, 11 (2011) (statement of Harold Hongju Koh, 
Legal Advisor, U.S. Dept. of State). 
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future presidents. . . .”84 He quite correctly noted that “the military 
operations that the President anticipated . . . were not sufficiently 
extensive . . . to constitute a ‘war’ requiring prior specific approval 
under the Declaration of War Clause,” adding: “Scholars will certainly 
go on debating this issue. But that should not distract those of us in 
government from the most urgent question now facing us which is not 
one of law but of policy.”85 
A legal opinion on the Libya operation by the Department of 
Justice’s Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) reasoned that legislative 
authorization was unnecessary, inter alia, because: “[T]he anticipated 
operations here served a ‘limited mission’ and did not ‘aim at the 
conquest or occupation of territory.’”86 The memorandum was dated 
April 1, 2011, and my first reaction upon reading it was that it must 
be an April Fool’s joke. The War Powers Resolution was enacted to 
prevent “future Vietnams,” and at no time in Vietnam did U.S. forces 
attempt “the conquest or occupation of territory.” Those conditions 
are not even arguably implicit in the statutory language. 
As someone who spent many years working in both political 
branches of government, I take pride that my legal positions have not 
shifted either because of the branch that issued my paycheck or the 
political party that occupied the White House. In the Senate, I 
strongly denounced as unconstitutional the War Powers Resolution, 
the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA),87 and the use of 
“legislative vetoes”88 that years later would be declared 
unconstitutional by the Supreme Court.89 But I am well familiar with 
the old Washington adage that “Where you stand often depends upon 
where you sit,” and watching my old friend Harold Koh attempting to 
reconcile the administration’s actions in Libya without totally 
84. Id. at 13.  
85. Id. at 17.  
86. Authority to Use Military Force in Libya, 35 Op. O.L.C. 1, 11 (2011) 
(emphasis added). 
87. For details on my constitutional (and policy) criticism of FISA, see, e.g., 
Congress Too Must “Obey the Law”: Why FISA Must Yield to the 
President’s Independent Constitutional Power to Authorize the 
Collection of Foreign Intelligence, Hearing Before the U.S. S. Comm. on 
the Jud. 109th Cong. 427 (2006) (statement of Robert F. Turner) 
[hereinafter Congress Too Must “Obey the Law”]; Is Congress the Real 
“Lawbreaker”?: Reconciling FISA with the Constitution, Hearing Before 
the H. Jud. Comm. 110th Cong. (2007) (statement of Robert F. Turner) 
[hereinafter Is Congress the Real “Lawbreaker”?]. 
88. For the text of a statement I drafted for Sen. Griffin on this issue in 
1976 (seven years before the Chadha decision), see 112 CONG. REC. 
17,643–46 (1976). 
89. See INS v. Chadha, 426 U.S. 919 (1983). 
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abandoning his historical adulation for the War Powers Resolution 
has been more than mildly amusing. 
IV. The War Powers Resolution is Unwise 
Let me turn now to my final point, that in addition to being 
unnecessary and flagrantly unconstitutional, the War Powers 
Resolution has done serious harm to the United States and the causes 
of world peace and human freedom. There is enough material here for 
a good size book, but I shall try to be brief. 
To begin with, the War Powers Resolution played at least a small 
part in persuading our enemies in Indochina that America had lost its 
will to fight and President Nixon (who, to his credit, still hoped to 
help protect the millions90 of non-communists who would later die 
when tyranny was allowed to prevail throughout Indochina) was no 
longer able to stymie their planned aggression. But, in fairness, 
Congress did far more damage six months prior to enactment of the 
War Powers Resolution when it enacted legislation prohibiting the 
expenditure of appropriated funds for “combat activities” anywhere in 
Indochina: 
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, on or after August 
15, 1973, no funds herein or heretofore appropriated may be 
obligated or expended to finance directly or indirectly combat 
activities by United States military forces in or over or from off 
the shores of North Vietnam, South Vietnam, Laos or 
Cambodia.91 
Congress clearly had the right to refuse to appropriate new funds 
for the war, which might ultimately have produced the same result; 
but the Framers of the Constitution unanimously excluded Congress 
from any direct role in ending wars (denying it the “power of 
peace”92) and they agreed that any “exceptions” to the president’s 
general control of foreign affairs and hostilities were to be “construed 
strictly.”93 In domestic affairs, Congress has great latitude in 
proscribing details as to how laws are to be executed. But legislation 
that interferes with the ways in which the commander-in-chief 
90. In Cambodia alone, the Yale Cambodia Genocide Program estimated 
that approximately 1.7 million people (more than 20% of the country’s 
population) died after Pol Pot’s Khmer Rouge (“Red Cambodians”) 
came to power in 1975. See The CGP 1994-2012, CAMBODIA GENOCIDE 
PROG., http://www.yale.edu/cgp/ (last visited Feb. 21, 2013). 
91. Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1974, H.R.J. Res. 636, 93rd Cong., § 108, 
87 Stat. 132 (1973). 
92. See supra text accompanying note 24. 
93. See supra text accompanying notes 14–16. 
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conducts hostilities—e.g., the proposals made by several legislators to 
prohibit the “surge” in Iraq (in which the commander-in-chief was 
committing reserve forces during an ongoing conflict, a core decision 
in the conduct of hostilities)—are inherently suspect. Here, the 
president is not executing powers delegated by Congress, but rather 
those granted directly to him by the people through the Constitution. 
I personally believe this statute to be unconstitutional. 
There is a popular belief in Congress and among some scholars 
that Congress can achieve its goals by attaching “conditions” to 
appropriations bills mandating how the president must act. And in 
settings where the president is simply executing authority delegated 
by Congress, that is often the case. But this power is limited—like all 
grants of constitutional power—to exercises of power that do not 
otherwise conflict with the Constitution itself.94 
Thus, when Congress in 1942 sought to attach a bill of attainder 
to a military supplemental appropriations act for World War II, 
arguing that the “power of the purse” was a plenary power and thus a 
“political question” not subject to judicial review, without dissent the 
Supreme Court struck it down.95 The fallacy of this modern view is 
easily demonstrated by a hypothetical. If Congress may by 
conditional appropriations usurp part of the Commander-in-Chief 
Power, by what logic may it not place comparable conditions upon 
appropriations for the judiciary—e.g., denying funds if the Supreme 
Court overturns (or fails to overturn) a controversial precedent (e.g., 
Row v. Wade96), or even prohibiting any exercise of the power of 
judicial review (which, unlike the Commander-in-Chief Power, is not 
expressly enumerated in the Constitution)? For that matter, why 
can’t Congress condition judicial appropriations upon the justices of 
the Supreme Court appearing before the Senate Judiciary Committee 
weekly during their term to receive instructions on how to decide 
pending cases? Such a theory would totally destroy the doctrine of 
94. See United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936):  
It is important to bear in mind that we are here dealing not 
alone with an authority vested in the President by an exertion 
of legislative power, but with such an authority plus the very 
delicate, plenary and exclusive power of the President as the sole 
organ of the federal government in the field of international 
relations—a power which does not require as a basis for its 
exercise an act of Congress but which, of course, like every other 
governmental power, must be exercised in subordination to the 
applicable provisions of the Constitution.  
 Id. at 319–20 (emphasis added). 
95. United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 315–16 (1946). 
96. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
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separation of powers and leave us with the legislative “tyranny” about 
which the Founding Fathers warned us.97 
Returning to the harm done by the War Powers Resolution, one 
could make a strong case that it encouraged Soviet adventurism in 
places like Angola98 and Afghanistan99—and undermined deterrence in 
97. The Supreme Court has repeatedly observed “the debates of the 
Constitutional Convention, and the Federalist Papers, are replete with 
expressions of fear that the Legislative Branch of the National 
Government will aggrandize itself at the expense of the other two 
branches.” See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 129 (1976); Bowsher 
v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 727 (1986). Typical of the prevailing view was 
Representative James Madison’s remark in 1789 that: “[I]f the federal 
Government should lose its proper equilibrium within itself, I am 
persuaded that the effect will proceed from the Encroachments of the 
Legislative department.” James Madison to Edmund Pendleton, supra 
note 13, at 406. 
98. This is not the occasion for a full discussion of the conflict in Angola. 
Summarized briefly, the April 1974 socialist revolution in Portugal led 
to the Alvor Agreement in January 1975 in which three rival 
revolutionary groups agreed to hold elections to decide the nation’s 
future in October. Moscow had been supporting the MPLA (People’s 
Movement for the Liberation of Angola) since 1961, and—following the 
Communist victories in Indochina—tens of thousands of Cubans were 
airlifted to Angola to support the MPLA. The United States began 
covertly assisting the two other groups (the FNLA and UNITA) to 
“level the playing field,” and on December 9 President Ford met 
personally with Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin to complain of 
the intervention. The airlift immediately stopped, but ten days later the 
Griffin Amendment (which I had drafted) was defeated, and the Senate 
quickly approved the Clark Amendment cutting off all CIA assistance to 
the non-Communist forces in Angola. The airlift immediately resumed. 
Estimates of the number of people who subsequently died in Angola 
before Congress repealed the Clark Amendment in 1985 range as high as 
1.5 million. See, e.g., Bethany Lacina & Nils Petter Gleditsch, 
Monitoring Trends in Global Combat: A New Dataset of Battle Deaths, 
21 EURO. J. POPULATION 145, 159 (2005). 
99. President Carter’s failure to understand the nature of Leninism likely 
played a significant role in undermining deterrence in this setting, but 
the fact that Congress had enacted legislation preventing him from 
responding to international aggression was almost certainly a factor. In 
June 1977, President Carter declared in a commencement address at 
Notre Dame University that America was finally free of its “inordinate 
fear of communism. . . .” See President Jimmy Carter, Human Rights 
and Foreign Policy, Commencement Remarks at Notre Dame University 
(June 1977), available at http://teachingamericanhistory.org/library/ 
index.asp?document=727. To his credit, President Carter became more 
aware of the Leninist threat following the Soviet invasion of 
Afghanistan. In his final weeks in office, President Carter began 
providing covert assistance to the Mujahideen in Afghanistan and 
military aid to the government of El Salvador as well. For a useful 
summary of why resisting Communist aggression was important, see 
132 
 
 
Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law·Vol. 45·2012 
The War Powers Resolution at 40 
Central America100 as well—but, for reasons of space, I want to focus 
on the deployment of peacekeepers in Beirut, Lebanon three decades 
ago. 
As some will remember, in 1982 President Reagan sent a 
contingent of Marines to join peacekeepers from Great Britain, 
France, and Italy in what might be described as a “presence” 
mission.101 The goal was simply to keep things peaceful and provide 
assurance to the representatives of the various rival factions in 
Lebanon that they could come together to try to negotiate a peace 
agreement without fear of being killed. Every country in the region 
and every faction in Beirut initially supported the mission. Further, 
the Chief Counsel to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Dr. 
Fred Tipson, told me personally that he had never seen better 
consultation from the White House on a military deployment. 
Not a single member of Congress objected to the deployment, 
although several recognized that there were some risks associated with 
sending U.S. forces into the region. Violence was not uncommon in 
either the Middle East or in Beirut at the time. But most observers 
seemed to think that the mission was warranted by the chance of 
bringing peace to Lebanon. 
If we apply Professor Chesney’s definition of “hostilities,”102 it is 
useful to note that the Rules of Engagement for the Marines were 
that they could “only return rather than initiate fire” and use force 
“only in self-defense.”103 The deployment had nothing to do with the 
power of Congress to “declare War.” 
Nevertheless, “consistent with” the War Powers Resolution, 
President Reagan submitted a report to Congress explaining the 
mission. But some congressional Democrats104 apparently saw political 
JEAN-LOUIS PANNÉ ET AL., THE BLACK BOOK OF COMMUNISM: CRIMES, 
TERROR REPRESSION (1999). 
100. For background on the conflict in Central America, see ROBERT F. 
TURNER, NICARAGUA V. UNITED STATES: A LOOK AT THE FACTS (1986); 
Robert F. Turner, Peace and the World Court: A Comment on the 
Paramilitary Activities Case, 20 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L. L. 53, 56–69 
(1987); and JOHN NORTON MOORE, THE SECRET WAR IN CENTRAL 
AMERICA (1987). 
101. TURNER, REPEALING THE WAR POWERS RESOLUTION, supra note 5, at 16.  
102. See Chesney, supra note 81. 
103. TURNER, REPEALING THE WAR POWERS RESOLUTION, supra note 5, at 
139 (citing S. REP. 98-242, 129 CONG. REC. 12914 (1983)). 
104. This is not in my view a partisan issue. A look at some of the remarks 
made by Republican leaders during the 2011 Libya operation reveals 
that neither political party has much interest in Senator Arthur 
Vanderberg’s principle that “politics should stop at the water’s edge” 
when the White House is controlled by the other party. Arthur 
Vandenberg: A Featured Biography, SENATE HISTORICAL OFFICE, 
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hay to be made if they could portray the deployment as “another 
Vietnam,” and House Foreign Affairs Committee chairman Clement 
Zablocki took public exception to the fact that President Reagan had 
not reported specifically under Section 4(a)(1), as required when a 
president sends U.S. armed forces “into hostilities or into situations 
where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the 
circumstances. . . .”105 Zablocki declared that the president’s failure to 
report under Section 4(a)(1) was “eroding the integrity of the law” 
and threatening a “constitutional crisis.”106 (One can only wonder how 
the various militia groups in Beirut would have responded to learning 
that President Reagan had informed Congress he was sending U.S. 
Marines into “hostilities” when they had been assured the 
multinational force intended only to engage in “peacekeeping.” 
Certainly such a message would not have contributed to the goal of 
reassuring the armed factions that they could safely engage in 
peaceful negotiations.) 
Particularly in the Senate, the debate soon took on an even more 
partisan tone. The Washington Post noted that “the fairly prominent 
involvement of Senate Democratic Campaign Chairman Lloyd 
Bentsen in the dispute . . . suggest[s] that the Democrats are doing 
push-ups for 1984.”107 Although the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee has historically prided itself for a tradition of non-
partisanship, when its report on the Beirut deployment legislation was 
released it included a section entitled “Minority Views of All 
Democratic Committee Members”108—which from my five years of 
experience working with that committee was uncommon if not 
unprecedented. 
During the hearings leading up to that report, Marine Corps 
Commandant General P.X. Kelley cautioned the Senators that their 
partisan debate was endangering the lives of his Marines. As 
summarized in the Committee Report: 
Marine Corps Commandant Paul X. Kelley testified to the 
Committee on September 13 that a short time limit might 
http://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/common/generic/Feature
d_Bio_Vandenberg.htm (last visited Feb. 21, 2013).  
105. For details on this deployment and relevant citations for this section of 
my paper, see TURNER, REPEALING THE WAR POWERS RESOLUTION, 
supra note 5, at 138–44. 
106. Clement Zablocki, Reagan is Skirting the War Powers Resolution, 
WASH. POST, Oct. 3, 1982, at B7. 
107. Helen Dewar, Senate Democrats Dig in Their Heals, WASH. POST, Sept. 
18, 1983, at A1. 
108. 129 CONG. REC. S12929 (daily ed. Sept. 26, 1983) (statement of Sen. 
Biden). 
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stimulate more attacks on the Marines in an effort to encourage 
a public outcry for the withdrawal. He commented that “I am 
concerned that we could impose what could prove to be a 
dangerous time constraint that would be misread by our 
potential adversaries. . . . It would encourage hostile forces or 
forces inimical to the best interest, the life and limb of the 
Marines.”109 
Soon thereafter, when an unidentified White House spokesman 
made the same point, Senate Democrats went ballistic. As reported in 
the Washington Post, Senator Thomas Eagleton “blasted back 
angrily” that “[t]o suggest . . . that congressional insistence that the 
law be lived up to is somehow giving aid and comfort to the enemy is 
totally unacceptable.” The Post observed: “When the anonymous 
White House comment implying danger for the Marines was reported 
on Capitol Hill, Democratic leaders were infuriated and, if anything, 
hardened their position.”110 
During the highly partisan Senate floor debate on a joint 
resolution to extend the deployment another eighteen months, 
Senator Joe Biden (D-Delaware) made reference to the fears expressed 
by some that even having the debate might be endangering the lives 
of the Marines in Beirut: 
[Y]ou have already heard the argument—“what will happen is 
that those who wish to see the marines leave and spoil things 
for Lebanon will in fact continue the pressure upon the United 
States of America by shelling the marines, building up support 
in America to bring the boys home”. . . . My response to that is 
that may be true, but until we once invoke the War Powers Act 
. . . . we are going to always be in the situation where we are 
beaten over the head by every administration that says 60 days 
is not enough time.111 
The joint resolution passed the Senate by the narrow margin of 54 
to 46—a shift in four votes could have denied the president 
authority—with only two Democrats breaking ranks and supporting 
President Reagan.112 Immediately after the vote, Foreign Relations 
Committee Chairman Charles Percy (R-Illinois) assured his Senate 
colleagues that “we are not simply dropping out of the picture” until 
the eighteen-month extension expired, and “we will follow the 
situation carefully,” emphasizing that the authorization could be 
109. Id. at S12913. 
110. T.R. Reid & Juan Williams, White House, Hill Battle Over War Powers 
Act, WASH. POST, Sept. 17, 1983, at A1. 
111. 129 CONG. REC. S12925 (daily ed. Sept. 26, 1983). 
112. 129 CONG. REC. S13167 (daily ed. Sept. 29, 1983). 
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amended “if the circumstances should justify it.”113 In case America’s 
adversaries missed that subtle message, the Christian Science Monitor 
had already put it more bluntly: “Congressional hesitation, 
reservations, and fears are such, however, that should American 
troops suffer casualties in Beirut, many senators and congressmen 
would immediately reconsider their support.”114 
The message was clearly not missed by the forces of radical Islam 
in the Middle East, and soon after the highly-partisan congressional 
debates, American intelligence intercepted a message between two 
Muslim militia units: “If we kill 15 Marines, the rest will leave.”115 
This intelligence intercept was apparently leaked to the news media, 
as it was quoted in the U.S. News & World Report that hit the 
streets on Monday, October 24, 1983.116 The day before, at 6:22 AM a 
terrorist truck bomb had claimed the lives of 241 sleeping Marine 
peacekeepers in Beirut. The truck bomb was estimated by the FBI to 
have been more powerful than 12,000 pounds of TNT—the largest 
non-nuclear, man-made explosion since World War II.117 
One might ask why the Marines were attacked. Traditionally, 
anyone considering attacking U.S. Marines would realize that, soon 
thereafter, a large contingent of other Marines with very bad attitudes 
would descend upon them and impose a painful lesson—not 
something any rational person would wish. But, starting with 
Vietnam, Congress changed the rules—in the process flagrantly 
disregarding the oath of office taken by each member to support the 
Constitution. And in Beirut, Congress unintentionally placed a virtual 
bounty on the lives of American Marines, assuring our enemies that if 
they could kill enough Marines, Congress would likely “reconsider” 
the deployment, and enough votes would be changed to require the 
prompt withdrawal of the survivors. This certainly wasn’t intentional, 
but at the same time the Senators had been expressly warned by the 
Commandant of the Marine Corps that their partisan debate was 
placing his Marines at risk.  
113. 129 CONG. REC. S12920 (daily ed. Sept. 26, 1983) (statement of Sen. 
Percy). 
114. John Knickerbocker & Daniel Southerland, Congress: A Wary “Aye” on 
Marines, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Sept. 22, 1983, at 1. 
115. Marines Draw a Bead on Snipers, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP’T, Oct. 31, 
1983, at 13.  
116. This periodical is always dated one week after it is released, presumably 
so potential purchasers will view it as still current news. To allow for 
printing and distribution, it would certainly have been finalized prior to 
the bombing of the Marine barracks the previous morning. 
117. Rick Hampson, 25 Years Later, Bombing in Beirut Still Resonates, USA 
TODAY Oct. 15, 2008, http://www.usatoday.com/news/military/2008-
10-15-beirut-barracks_N.htm. 
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Soon thereafter, the remaining Marines were withdrawn. But 
that’s not the end of the story. In 1998, Osama bin Laden told an 
ABC News reporter in Afghanistan: “We have seen in the last decade 
the decline of American power and the weakness of the American 
Soldier, who is ready to wage Cold Wars, but unprepared to fight 
long wars. This was proven in Beirut in 1983 when the Marines fled 
after two explosions.”118 It does not take a rocket scientist to 
recognize that the partisan and unconstitutional 1983 congressional 
debates pursuant to the War Powers Resolution on the Beirut 
deployment played a major role in persuading Osama bin Laden to 
launch the 9/11 attacks eighteen years later. 
In fairness, the Beirut congressional debates were not the only 
factor. Time will not permit a detailed discussion of the role of 
Congress in undermining U.S. humanitarian efforts to save hundreds 
of thousands of lives in Somalia in 1991 to 1993, for example. But 
when Major General Thomas Montgomery requested Abrams tanks 
for force protection, “[t]he Clinton team, under mounting 
congressional pressure to withdraw all U.S. forces, blocked this 
recommendation.”119 Soon thereafter, on the night of October 3–4, 
118. Robert T. Jordan, Courage in the Face of Terror, NAVAL HIST. MAG. 
(Oct. 2008), http://www.usni.org/magazines/navalhistory/2008-10/cou 
rage-face-terror. See also Scott Dodd & Peter Smolowitz, 1983 Beirut 
Bomb Began Era of Terror, DESERET NEWS Oct. 20 2003, http:// 
www.deseretnews.com/article/515039782/1983-Beirut-bomb-began-era-
of-terror.html?pg=all; Peter Arnett, Transcript of Osama Bin Ladin 
Interview, http://www.anusha.com/osamaint.htm (last visited Feb. 21, 
2013). Bin Laden said: 
After a little resistance, The American troops left after achieving 
nothing. They left after claiming that they were the largest 
power on earth. They left after some resistance from powerless, 
poor, unarmed people whose only weapon is the belief in Allah 
The Almighty, and who do not fear the fabricated American 
media lies. We learned from those who fought there, that they 
were surprised to see the low spiritual morale of the American 
fighters in comparison with the experience they had with the 
Russian fighters. The Americans ran away from those fighters 
who fought and killed them, while the latter were still there. If 
the U.S. still thinks and brags that it still has this kind of power 
even after all these successive defeats in Vietnam, Beirut, Aden, 
and Somalia, then let them go back to those who are awaiting 
its return. 
 Id.  
119. THE ART OF COMMAND: MILITARY LEADERSHIP FROM GEORGE 
WASHINGTON TO COLIN POWELL 260 (Harry S. Laver & Jeffrey J. 
Matthews eds., 2008) (emphasis added); see also Lt. Col. Kevin H. 
Winters, U.S. Army War College, Access to the President by Combatant 
Commanders 9–10 (1999), available at http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-
bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA363928. A useful time-line of events in 
Somalia can be found at Ambush in Mogadishu, PBS, http://www.pbs. 
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1993, eighteen American rangers were killed and eighty-four others 
wounded in an event later portrayed in the 2001 movie Blackhawk 
Down—a tragedy that might easily have been prevented by the use of 
the denied Abrams tanks. The subsequent withdrawal of U.S. forces 
provided further evidence to bin Laden that Americans had no 
stomach for casualties.120 
This leads me to my final point. The War Powers Resolution is 
hardly the only unconstitutional statute enacted by Congress in the 
wake of Vietnam that has done serious harm to our nation and the 
cause of peace. Indeed, having played a prominent role via the War 
Powers Resolution in providing the incentives that led bin Laden to 
attack America on 9/11, a separate statute usurped the president’s 
constitutional power over what John Jay in Federalist No. 64 referred 
to as “the business of intelligence”121—preventing our intelligence 
community from discovering and preventing the plots that killed 
nearly 3,000 Americans on September 11, 2001. I am talking, of 
course, about the 1978 Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA).  
From 1981 to 1984, I worked in the White House as counsel to 
the President’s Intelligence Oversight Board. One of my duties was to 
ensure that the Federal Bureau of Investigation, National Security 
Agency, and other elements of the intelligence community complied 
with laws (and Executive Orders) constraining intelligence activities—
one of the most important of which being the FISA statute. Now is 
not the time for a detailed discussion of this statute, but it makes it a 
felony for anyone within the intelligence community to engage in 
electronic surveillance within the United States unless he or she first 
obtains a warrant from the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court—
and to obtain such a warrant he or she must satisfy the court that the 
target of the surveillance is a “foreign power” or agent thereof. The 
term “foreign power” is defined so as to include international terrorist 
organizations like al-Qaeda. 
To their credit, FBI agents in San Diego identified two of the men 
who later hijacked American Airlines Flight 77 that crashed into the 
Pentagon on 9/11 as potential terrorists, but they had no evidence to 
tie them to al-Qaeda and were instructed to back off out of fear even 
a visual surveillance in public might lead to civil liberties complaints.  
Similarly, FBI agents in Minneapolis learned that Zacarias 
Moussaoui was taking lessons to learn how to pilot large commercial 
jet aircraft, and they became convinced he was a foreign terrorist who 
org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/ambush/etc/cron.html (last visited 
Feb. 21, 2013); see also ROBERT PATTERSON, RECKLESS DISREGARD 112–
13 (2004). 
120. See 129 CONG. REC. S12926 (daily ed. Sept. 26, 1983) (statement of Sen. 
Biden). 
121. See infra text accompanying notes 130–31. 
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intended to use a hijacked plane as a weapon. Repeatedly, they 
sought assistance from the National Security Law Unit of the FBI’s 
Washington, D.C., headquarters; but they were told (correctly) that 
without evidence Moussaoui was an “agent of a foreign power” such a 
warrant could not be obtained.122 After the 9/11 attacks, Coleen 
Rowley—the chief legal adviser to the Minneapolis FBI office—wrote 
a scathing memorandum to FBI Director Robert Mueller complaining 
about the incompetence of the bureaucrats at FBI headquarters—
which along with congressional testimony to the same effect resulted 
in her being named one of three “whistleblowers” in Time magazine’s 
“Persons of the Year” in 2002.123 
In reality, the lawyers in the National Security Law Unit did 
exactly what the statute required and patiently explained to Ms. 
Rowley that if she could not find information linking Moussaoui to a 
foreign power she might try to obtain a criminal warrant through the 
local U.S. Attorney. But Ms. Rowley believed the U.S. Attorney’s 
office in Minneapolis was too strict in its requirements for probable 
cause, and did not pursue that avenue124—a decision she later 
admitted she regretted.125 Ultimately, there was a major investigation 
by the Department of Justice Inspector General’s Office, and in their 
(declassified in 2006) report of more than 400 pages the inspectors 
emphasized Ms. Rowley’s ignorance of the FISA statute.126 
This same Inspector General report revealed what may be another 
consequence of the congressional assault of presidential powers 
following the Vietnam War. Specifically, a strong case can be made 
that the reason America could not get the information necessary to 
sustain a FISA warrant for Moussaoui is because one of our most 
important foreign allies did not believe we could be trusted with 
extremely sensitive intelligence information.  
The report notes that the FBI had made repeated inquires both in 
writing and by phone of the British government seeking any 
information it might have tying Moussaoui to al-Qaeda or any other 
“foreign power.”127 Although it was emphasized that the request was 
extremely urgent, weeks went by with no response. The day after the 
122. U. S. Dep’t of Justice, Off. of the Inspector Gen., A Review of the FBI’s 
Handling of Intelligence Information Related to the September 11 
Attacks 141–43 (Nov. 2004) (publicly released June 2006), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/oig/special/s0606/final.pdf. 
123. Richard Lacayo & Amanda Ripley, Persons of The Year 2002: The 
Whistleblowers, TIME (Dec. 30, 2002), http://www.time.com/time/mag 
azine/article/0,9171,1003998,00.html. 
124. U. S. Dep’t of Justice, supra note 122, at 130–31, 140. 
125. Id. at 140. 
126. See, e.g., id. at 190 n.146. 
127. Id. at 101, 121, 151. 
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attacks of September 11, 2001, killed thousands of Americans, the 
British provided the FBI with information that Moussaoui had 
attended an al-Qaeda training camp128—information that might 
theoretically have allowed the FBI to obtain a FISA warrant to 
search Moussaoui’s laptop and collect other information that might 
have prevented the attacks. (I say “theoretically,” because FISA 
warrants require considerable documentation and layers of high-level 
approval, and in 2001 usually took weeks if not months to obtain once 
the necessary evidence of a tie to a “foreign power” like al-Qaeda had 
been established. So even if the British had been more cooperative, 
the request for a warrant might well have still been tied up in 
procedural delay when the attacks occurred. The entire fiasco 
reaffirms the brilliance of the Founding Fathers, who repeatedly 
emphasized the need for “speed and dispatch” in military and 
diplomatic matters.) 
The Inspector General report concluded: “It is not clear why the 
information from the British was not provided to the FBI until after 
September 11.”129 One possible explanation that comes readily to 
mind is that the source of the British intelligence might have been 
extremely sensitive—someone providing information of the greatest 
importance who might be killed if such information became public, 
and the United States could not be relied upon to keep secrets. While 
classified information is leaked by members of both political branches, 
the access given to legislators and their staff starting in the mid-1970s 
has been a source of particular concern to foreign intelligence services 
that have traditionally been cooperative with the United States. And 
while I deplore the delay that might possibly have prevented the 9/11 
attacks, I can’t honestly say that I blame the British for wishing to 
protect their sources and methods. 
If fear of American “leaks” was in reality the reason the British 
withheld the information on Moussaoui, it was hardly a new concern. 
Writing in Federalist No. 64 in 1788, John Jay had explained that the 
reason the Congress had been excluded from any role in “the business 
of intelligence” was because their members could not be trusted to 
keep secrets130 and foreign intelligence sources would be unwilling to 
128. Id. at 180. 
129. Id.  
130. In 1776, when the Committee of Secret Correspondence of the Second 
Continental Congress learned through secret agents that France had 
agreed to provide major assistance to aid the new nation in its war for 
independence against Great Britain, Benjamin Franklin and the other 
four members of the Committee unanimously concluded that they could 
not share the information with anyone else in Congress, adding in their 
secret report: “We find by fatal experience that Congress consists of too 
many members to keep secrets.” Verbal Statement of Thomas Story to 
140 
 
 
Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law·Vol. 45·2012 
The War Powers Resolution at 40 
share sensitive information if they knew it would be shared with 
legislators: 
These are cases where the most useful intelligence may be 
obtained, if the persons possessing it can be relieved from 
apprehensions of discovery. Those apprehensions will operate on 
those persons whether they are actuated by mercenary or 
friendly motives; and there doubtless are many of both 
descriptions, who would rely on the secrecy of the President, 
but who would not confide in that of the Senate, and still less in 
that of a large popular Assembly. The convention have done 
well, therefore, in so disposing of the power of making treaties, 
that although the President must, in forming, them act by the 
advice and consent of the Senate, yet he will be able to manage 
the business of intelligence in such manner as prudence may 
suggest.131  
I have charged that FISA was unconstitutional, and a brief 
summary of the reasons for that conclusion may be in order before 
bringing this piece to a close. I worked in the Senate when FISA was 
enacted in 1978 and I believed it to be unconstitutional at the time. I 
have testified before both the Senate132 and House133 Judiciary 
committees on the statute at some length since the 9/11 attacks, but 
space will not permit a lengthy discussion of its infirmities here. I will 
note that every federal court to decide the issue has held that there is 
a “national security” or “foreign intelligence” exception to the Fourth 
Amendment’s warrant requirement, and when the 1980 Truong 
case,134 reaching that same conclusion, was appealed to the Supreme 
Court, not a single justice voted to grant certiorari.135 Indeed, even 
Congress recognized the president’s independent constitutional power 
to collect “foreign intelligence information” when it wrote the first 
the Committee, in 2 AMERICAN ARCHIVES: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF 
THE NORTH AMERICAN COLONIES 819 (Peter Force ed., 1837–1853). 
131. FEDERALIST No. 64, at 434–35 (Jacob E. Cooke, ed. 1961) (emphasis 
added). 
132. See Congress Too Must “Obey the Law,” supra note 87.  
133. See Is Congress the Real “Lawbreaker”?, supra note 87.  
134. United States v. Truong, 629 F.2d 908, 912 (4th Cir. 1980). The court 
held that “separation of powers requires us to acknowledge the principal 
responsibility of the President for foreign affairs and concomitantly for 
foreign intelligence surveillance.” Id. at 914. 
135. The Court usually does not grant certiorari when all of the circuits are 
in accord, but surely if the justices had believed that the government 
was violating fundamental principles of the Bill of Rights at least one of 
them would have made that known. 
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federal wiretap law in 1968,136 and the appellate court established by 
the FISA statute unanimously noted in 2002: 
The Truong court, as did all the other courts to have decided 
the issue, held that the President did have inherent authority to 
conduct warrantless searches to obtain foreign intelligence 
information. . . . We take for granted that the President does 
have that authority and, assuming that is so, FISA could not 
encroach on the President’s constitutional power.137  
Those interested in a more detailed discussion of the issue are 
invited to examine my extensive congressional testimony on the 
issue.138 
Speaking at the National Press Club in Washington, D.C., on 
January 23, 2006, the Director of the National Security Agency from 
1999 to 2005 discussed the Terrorist Surveillance Program (TSP) 
authorized by President Bush shortly after the 9/11 attacks and 
declared: “Had this program been in effect prior to 9/11, it is my 
professional judgment that we would have detected some of the 9/11 
al Qaeda operatives in the United States, and we would have 
identified them as such.”139 From working with the Intelligence 
Community over many decades, and private conversations with 
friends in the business both from this country and abroad, I don’t 
think there is any doubt about that. 
V. Conclusion 
In conclusion, the 1973 War Powers Resolution is a horrible law. 
It is without the slightest doubt unconstitutional—not just in specific 
terms like the legislative veto in Section 5(c), but at its very core. Nor 
does it serve any serious purpose, because it was premised upon the 
136. “Nothing contained in this chapter . . . shall limit the constitutional 
power of the President to take such measures as he deems necessary to 
protect the Nation against actual or potential attack or other hostile 
acts of a foreign power, to obtain foreign intelligence information 
deemed essential to the security of the United States, or to protect 
national security information against foreign intelligence activities.” 
Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. § 2511(3) (1970) 
(emphasis added). 
137. In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717, 742 (Foreign Intel. Surv. Ct. Rev. 
2002) (emphasis added). 
138. See Congress Too Must “Obey the Law,” supra note 87; Is Congress the 
Real “Lawbreaker”?, supra note 87.  
139. Michael V. Hayden, Principal Deputy Dir. of Nat’l Intelligence, Address 
to the National Press Club: What American Intelligence & Especially 
the NSA Have Been Doing to Defend the Nation (Jan. 23 2006), 
available at http://www.fas.org/irp/news/2006/01/hayden012306.html. 
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falsehood that “imperial presidents” took America to war in Korea 
and Vietnam without consulting Congress, when the facts clearly 
show that President Truman was talked out of seeking an AUMF in 
Korea and the Indochina War (not only in South Vietnam, but in 
Cambodia as well) was formally authorized with the affirmative votes 
of 99.6% of the members of Congress. 
Finally, I submit that the evidence shows that partisan debates 
over the War Powers Resolution—and the military disasters they 
produced—were a primary factor in Osama bin Laden’s decision to 
launch the 9/11 attacks, and another post-Vietnam unconstitutional 
statute (FISA) prevented our intelligence community from detecting 
and preventing those attacks. 
The time has come to demand—as the bipartisan National War 
Powers Commission unanimously recommended four years ago—that 
Congress repeal the 1973 War Powers Resolution. Forty years of 
congressional law-breaking is long enough. 
  
 
143 
